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REVISITING JURISDICTION’S SOCIAL COST: A BRIEF 
REJOINDER TO PROFESSOR KLERMAN 
Dustin E. Buehler* 
My recent article Solving Jurisdiction’s Social Cost examines issues 
implicated by nonwaivable federal court subject-matter jurisdiction.1 I 
argue that courts and commentators are prone to monistic theories of 
jurisdictional value, failing to consider the full range of interests 
implicated by jurisdictional rules.2 I then catalogue the various interests 
arising from jurisdictional rules.3 Lastly, I advance several solutions, 
including early jurisdictional certification orders, a cut-off point for 
jurisdictional challenges, interlocutory appeals of jurisdictional rulings, 
and sanctions to deter private-party abuse.4 
Daniel Klerman’s response to my article is articulate, well-reasoned, 
and persuasive.5 Among other contentions, he suggests that mandatory 
jurisdictional certification by district courts may incur greater costs than 
those associated with nonwaivable jurisdictional rules.6 Professor 
Klerman challenges the notion that the efficiency and structural interests 
underlying jurisdictional rules are incommensurable.7 And he outlines a 
novel alternative approach in which federal courts could call for the 
views of state attorneys general when appropriate to identify and protect 
federalism concerns and state prerogatives.8 
I commend Professor Klerman for his significant contribution to the 
economic literature on federal court subject-matter jurisdiction. This 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, dbuehler@uark.edu. 
1.  Dustin E. Buehler, Solving Jurisdiction’s Social Cost, 89 WASH. L. REV. 653 (2014). 
2.  Id. at 658–72. 
3.  Id. at 672–88. 
4.  Id. at 689–706. 
5.  See Daniel Klerman, An Economic Analysis of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Waiver: A 
Response to Professor Buehler, 89 WASH. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2014). 
6.  Id. at 3–6. 
7.  Id. at 6–10; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 779, 796 (1994) (“Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be aligned 
along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgment about how these goods are 
best characterized.”). 
8.  Klerman, supra note 5, at 10–12. 
1 
                                                     
Buehler Rejoinder_Post DTP-Copy.docx (Do Not Delete) 2/3/2015  7:37 AM 
2 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 90:1 
rejoinder briefly responds to a few of his key arguments, with the goals 
of advancing the discussion even further and encouraging others to join 
the debate. 
Although the costs of jurisdictional certification identified by 
Professor Klerman deserve serious consideration, many are not as 
insurmountable as they first appear. The parties’ attorneys and federal 
courts will easily confirm the existence of jurisdiction in the vast 
majority of cases, with virtually no effort. For example, confirming the 
existence of jurisdiction in most federal question cases arising under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 requires no effort at all—the complaint cites a federal law 
cause of action that the attorney presumably already found while 
researching the plaintiff’s claims for relief. In cases with thorny 
jurisdictional issues, district courts perhaps could adjudicate other 
potentially dispositive procedural matters (i.e., any relatively 
straightforward venue or personal jurisdiction defects) before turning to 
subject-matter jurisdiction—a sequencing of issues that would be 
consistent with my proposals.9 Moreover, early jurisdictional 
certification provides valuable information for settlement discussions, 
allowing parties to negotiate with confidence that the court has 
jurisdiction over the dispute (and, more importantly, jurisdiction to issue 
any orders necessary to effectuate a settlement).10 
Courts and parties also can find ways to mitigate the burdens 
associated with jurisdictional certification. Done in an efficient manner, 
jurisdictional certification would be worthwhile because it would 
eliminate costs associated with jurisdictional uncertainty, while allowing 
federal courts to assess important structural values as a matter of 
course.11 For instance, district court clerks’ offices could promulgate a 
standard form for certification orders, with auto-populated fields that 
draw relevant case information from the electronic case filing system.12 
This would allow judges to quickly certify jurisdiction by filling in a 
terse sentence or two, reciting key facts. If Professor Klerman is correct 
9.  Buehler, supra note 1, at 697 & n.278 (citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Co., 
549 U.S. 422, 431–32 (2007); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999)). 
10.  See generally Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of Separation: Settlement Agreements and 
Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 275 (2010). 
11.  Buehler, supra note 1, at 695–96. 
12.  Auto-populated forms have been used effectively in other governmental contexts to reduce 
the time and expense of routine functions. See, e.g., Art Heinz, One Million State Police Traffic 
Citations Issued Electronically, ALLEGHENY CNTY. BAR ASS’N LAWYERS J., May 4, 2012, at 10. A 
vast amount of relevant information on pending civil cases is easily accessible due to electronic case 
filing in federal courts nationwide. See Public Access to Court Electronic Records, 
https://www.pacer.gov (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
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that most judges’ chambers already routinely check subject-matter 
jurisdiction in all cases,13 then the additional time necessary to complete 
an auto-populated form would be minimal, even in the aggregate, and 
especially when compared to other routine functions performed by 
federal courts.14 
In any event, the benefits of my proposals likely outweigh the costs of 
certification. Notably, the efficiency gains from early jurisdictional 
rulings would not be limited to cases with latent jurisdictional defects. 
Instead, mandatory jurisdictional certification in every case—paired with 
the availability of discretionary appellate review on an interlocutory 
basis—would significantly increase the number of precedential opinions 
on these matters, providing future litigants with valuable information 
and predictability regarding the boundaries of federal court subject-
matter jurisdiction.15 
Furthermore, even if the aggregate costs of jurisdictional certification 
were to exceed costs associated with nonwaivable jurisdictional rules,16 
the crux of my argument is that we should not view these costs to 
efficiency values in isolation.17 Jurisdictional rules must accommodate 
significant structural interests, and at least some of those interests 
probably cannot be easily reduced to a metric that is also common to 
efficiency values. Although Professor Klerman likely is correct that 
many federalism sub-values can be expressed in a way that is 
commensurable with litigation costs,18 I doubt that is true for all relevant 
structural interests. Suppose, for example, that in a particular lawsuit 
there would be no difference between state court and federal court 
litigation costs and accuracy, the case presents no novel legal questions, 
and the case would not meaningfully impact the workload of either court 
system. From the vantage point of accuracy and litigation costs, there is 
no reason why we would care whether the parties litigate in state or 
federal court. But if the lawsuit does not have a basis for federal court 
13.  Klerman, supra note 5, at 4. 
14.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (requiring federal district courts to issue case scheduling and 
pretrial conference orders in all civil cases). 
15.  See Buehler, supra note 1, at 679–80 (“Published jurisdictional decisions have precedential 
value for similarly situated litigants, and deter other parties from transcending jurisdictional 
boundaries.”). 
16.  See Klerman, supra note 5, at 3–6 (arguing the costs of jurisdictional certification may 
exceed costs associated with jurisdictional nonwaivability); Buehler, supra note 1, at 696–97 
(acknowledging this possibility). 
17.  Professor Klerman and I agree on this point. See Buehler, supra note 1, at 668–72; Klerman, 
supra note 5, at 2. 
18.  Klerman, supra note 5, at 7–10. 
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subject-matter jurisdiction, the federal courts cannot hear the case—
suggesting that some of the structural sub-values underlying 
jurisdictional boundaries cannot easily be reduced to metrics 
commensurable with efficiency and accuracy concerns.19 
Finally, I am intrigued by Professor Klerman’s alternative proposal to 
allow federal courts to call for the views of state attorneys general in 
order to identify and protect various state interests implicated by 
jurisdictional rules.20 A state-attorney-general approach has the benefit 
of being relatively easy to implement within the current federal court 
system; federal courts already ask for the views of state attorneys 
general in some situations. For example, federal appellate courts 
sometimes request amicus briefing from state attorneys general in 
appeals of prisoner civil rights cases dismissed at the screening stage 
(before state defendants are served), especially when a case involves 
matters of first impression or other potentially important legal 
questions.21 
A state-attorney-general approach is not without potential drawbacks 
and limitations, of course. As commentators have noted in other 
contexts, some attorney general offices can be “understaffed and 
underfunded” and “highly political” at times.22 It is not unusual for those 
offices to be primarily “concerned with more politically remunerative 
areas of law enforcement.”23 That said, involvement of state attorneys 
general to help protect state prerogatives in the jurisdictional context is 
an idea worth considering. It may even be possible to implement a 
modified version of Professor Klerman’s state-attorney-general approach 
19.  Indeed, my skepticism regarding our ability to quantify and weigh all relevant values using a 
common metric extends beyond the jurisdictional context. Professor Klerman cites environmental 
policy as an example of an area in which policymakers work around incommensurable values by 
surveying and measuring people’s willingness to pay for environmental quality. Klerman, supra 
note 5, at 7. And yet, commentators have noted that such methods can encounter difficulties in 
accurately measuring certain types of values. See, e.g., Note, “Ask a Silly Question . . .”: Contingent 
Valuation of Natural Resource Damages, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1981, 1982 (1992) (arguing that 
contingent valuation surveys do not accurately measure nonuse values associated with 
environmental damage). 
20.  Klerman, supra note 5, at 10–12. 
21.  See, e.g., Order, Nordstrom v. Ryan, No. 12-15738 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2013), ECF No. 13 
(requesting the Arizona Attorney General to enter an appearance or file an amicus curiae brief); 
Order, Belanus v. Clark, No. 12-35952 (9th Cir. June 19, 2014), ECF No. 18 (requesting the same 
from the Montana Attorney General). 
22.  Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIS. 
L. REV. 227, 251 (1999); see also Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable 
Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 48 (1993) (“Attorneys general’s offices are traditionally understaffed, 
underfunded, and have many pressing concerns[.]”). 
23.  Manne, supra note 22, at 251. 
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consistent with many of the proposals I advance in my article. For 
instance, when a federal court suspects that issues underlying 
jurisdictional certification would implicate state prerogatives,24 it could 
give the state attorney general an opportunity to file an amicus curiae 
brief. Similarly, appellate courts hearing interlocutory appeals of 
jurisdictional rulings could invite participation by state attorneys general 
at that phase of the litigation. This would allow states to assert their 
prerogatives during the jurisdictional certification process. 
In sum, there is much merit in Professor Klerman’s well-written 
response, which makes an important contribution to existing literature. 
His state-attorney-general approach deserves consideration. 
Nevertheless, I contest the notion that the costs of my proposals would 
outweigh their benefits. Jurisdictional certification can be accomplished 
efficiently in the vast majority of cases, and a conclusive determination 
of jurisdictional issues at the onset of litigation will offer much-needed 
certainty and predictability to all litigants. 
 
24.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2012) (allowing district courts to refuse to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction when a “claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law”); Grable & 
Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (holding that courts must 
consider the “balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities” when determining whether 
federal question jurisdiction exists over federal issues embedded in state-law claims). 
 
                                                     
